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ABSTRACT.  Many commentators have claimed that farm subsidies have contributed 
significantly to the “obesity epidemic” by making fattening foods relatively cheap and 
abundant and, symmetrically, that taxing “unhealthy”  commodities  or subsidizing 
“healthy” commodities would contribute to reducing obesity rates.  This paper makes 
three contributions.  First, we review evidence from the literature on the impacts on food 
consumption and obesity resulting from subsidies applied in the past to production or 
consumption of farm commodities.  Second, we develop and present new arguments 
and preliminary evidence on the impacts of past government investments in agricultural 
R&D on food consumption and  obesity—through research-induced increases in 
agricultural productivity and the consequences for prices, production, and consumption 
of farm  commodities.  Third, we consider and compare the economic efficiency of 
hypothetical  agricultural research policies (changing the orientation of agricultural 
research investments) versus hypothetical agricultural commodity subsidies and taxes 
as alternative mechanisms for encouraging consumption of healthy food or discouraging 
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1.  Introduction 
In this paper we examine the links between farm policies—including farm 
commodity programs and public agricultural research and development (R&D)—and 
farm commodity prices in the United States, and the implications of farm policy-induced 
commodity-price changes for food prices, food consumption, and obesity.  We conclude 
that U.S. farm subsidy programs have had negligible effects on the prices paid by 
consumers for food and thus negligible influence on dietary patterns and obesity, 
consistent with some previous work by economists on the issue (e.g., Cutler, Glaeser, 
and Shapiro 2003a, 2003b; Miller and Coble 2007), but contradicting the mainstream 
view presented in the media (e.g., Pollan 2003).  In contrast, however, through their 
effects on agricultural productivity, agricultural R&D policies have had substantial 
impacts on farm commodity prices and may have had much more significant impacts on 
consumption and obesity.  In real terms, the prices of major agricultural commodities 
have fallen by 50 percent or more since 1950, and agricultural R&D has been credited 
as the primary engine for those changes (e.g., Alston, Pardey and Beddow 2009).  We 
examine the potential for R&D-cum agricultural productivity-induced changes in 
commodity prices to contribute to obesity, and consider the potential for alternative R&D 
policies to be established with a view to reducing the future prevalence of obesity among 
Americans.
1
2.  Motivation and Background 
 
Obesity is a big business.  The prevalence of overweight and obesity has 
increased rapidly in the United States—the average American adult added 9–12 pounds 
                                                 
1 U.S. agricultural R&D has substantial international spillover effects on agricultural technology 
(e.g., see Alston 2001).  If research-induced productivity gains contribute significantly to social 
costs of obesity, U.S. agricultural R&D might have negative international spillovers costs from 
obesity to count against the positive spillover benefits reported in some of the literature on 2 
 
during the 1990s (Ruhm 2007)—and the related health concerns are priority issues for 
the U.S. government and the medical community.  This phenomenon is not unique to the 
United States.  The proportion of the adult population classified as overweight or obese 
is particularly high in the United States but is growing rapidly throughout much of the 
world (World Health Organization, 1997; International Obesity Task Force, 2005).  
Obese and overweight Americans generate large additional direct and indirect health 
care expenses.  In his “Call to Action to Decrease Overweight and Obesity” the U.S. 
Surgeon reported that, in 2000, the total cost of obesity was estimated to be $117 billion 
($61 billion direct and $56 billion indirect).  Without endorsing these particular estimates, 
we note that these costs will increase with increases in the U.S. prevalence of obesity, 
especially severe obesity, which is projected to continue to rise (e.g., see Ruhm 2007).   
The U.S. government has a stated objective of reducing obesity but the 
appropriate policy is not clear.  One option is to implement ever-more-vigorous public 
education programs.  Another option is to revise the food and nutrition programs 
administered by the USDA to encourage healthier diets of participants.
2  Various 
proposals have been raised and some have been subjected to analysis by economists.
3
                                                                                                                                                 
agricultural research benefits.  We reserve this point (which we owe to Joanna Parks) for future 
research.  
  
Further options include regulatory or fiscal instruments that attempt to discourage less-
healthy and encourage more-healthy consumption choices.  For instance, some writers 
have speculated about banning certain types of advertising, taxing foods with high fat or 
high sugar content, or subsidizing healthier foods such as fresh fruit and vegetables, and 
2 These programs include the Food Stamp Program, the Special Supplemental Program for 
Women, Infants, and Children (the WIC Program), and the School Lunch Program, among others. 
3 For instance, proposals for a more-healthy Food Stamp Program have been analyzed by 
Mullally et al. (2007) and Guthrie et al. (2007).  The Food Stamp Program may have contributed 
to an increase in obesity among participants, though the evidence is mixed with differential results 
between men and women, and the effects found are generally small (e.g., see Baum 2007; Chen, 
Yen, and Eastwood 2005; Gibson 2003, 2004; Kaushal 2007; Ver Ploeg, Mancino, and Lin 2006, 3 
 
economists have analyzed some of these possibilities.  One popular idea is that 
American farm subsidies contribute significantly to obesity and that reducing these 
subsidies will go a long way towards solving the problem (e.g., Pollan 2003).   
The idea that farm subsidies have contributed significantly to the problem of 
obesity in the United States has been reported frequently in the press, and has assumed 
the character of a stylized fact.
4  It is conceptually possible that farm policies contribute 
to lower relative prices and increased consumption of fattening foods by making certain 
farm commodities more abundant and therefore cheaper.  However, several economic 
studies have found these effects to be small or nonexistent.  Section 3 of this paper 
reviews this and other U.S. and international evidence about the effects of farm 
commodity subsidies on food prices and obesity.
5
A related idea is that other farm bill policies, such as public agricultural R&D, 
have contributed to obesity by making farm commodities cheaper and more abundant.  
For this to be true, public agricultural R&D must have made farm commodities that are 
important ingredients of relatively fattening foods significantly more abundant and less 
expensive.  Second, the lower commodity prices caused by R&D must have resulted in 
significantly lower costs to the food industry, cost savings that were passed on to 
consumers in the form of lower prices of relatively fattening food.  Third, food 
consumption must have changed significantly in response to these policy-induced 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
2007).  Even if the current program has not caused obesity, a revised program may contribute to 
reducing obesity, but the analysis to date has generally not been favorable to the idea.   
4 Examples abound.  For instance, in November 2007 alone, articles were published Nicole 
Gaouette, in the Los Angeles Times http://www.latimes.com/news/science/la-na-
farmbill25nov25,1,6084664.story?coll=la-news-science&ctrack=1&cset=true, Amanda Paulson in 
the Christian Science Monitor http://www.csmonitor.com/2007/1116/p03s01-uspo.html, Michael 
Grunwald in Time magazine, http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1680139,00.html, 
and Michael Pollan in the New York Times 
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/11/04/opinion/04pollan.html?incamp=article_popular.   
5 This part of the paper draws significantly (at times verbatim) on Alston, Sumner, and Vosti 
(2008).   4 
 
changes in the relative prices of more- versus less-fattening foods.  Section 4 of this 
paper gives attention to that issue.   
In the 2008 Farm Bill the U.S. government introduced the Specialty Crops 
Research Initiative, mandating funding of $50 million per year for FY 2009-12 and 
authorizing additional annual appropriations of $100 million for a new program of 
competitive research grants.  In the Farm Bill debate, arguments for enhanced funding 
for specialty crops research emphasized concerns with competitiveness and the fact that 
specialty crops producers mostly do not receive other subsidies (a point that was at 
times connected to discussions about proposed revisions to farm program provisions 
that prevented planting of specialty crops on program base acres).
6
3.  Farm Subsidies, Fat Taxes and Thin Subsidies – A Review of Findings 
  Implications for 
health and nutrition were also often raised as part of the case although the arguments 
were not developed in much detail.  In Section 5 we develop a stylized model in which 
we illustrate the implications of R&D policies in a world in which food consumption 
entails costs of health-care system externalities.  Section 6 concludes the paper. 
In principle, taxes and subsidies applied to food commodities or products could 
be used to align the private marginal cost with the marginal social cost of excess food 
consumption, and hence, weight outcomes.  Several proposals have been raised 
including eliminating farm subsidies on particular commodities that are used as inputs 
into unhealthy food production (e.g., corn), taxing food products or characteristics of food 
products that are deemed unhealthy (e.g., snack foods, fat content), and subsidizing 
                                                 
6 Ultimately the 2008 Farm Bill did not eliminate the provision that specialty crops could not be 
grown on base acres.  However, a new 2008 Farm Bill Pilot Program will allow farmers to switch 
acres to cucumbers, green peas, lima beans, pumpkins, snap beans, sweet corn and tomatoes 
as long as these crops are grown under contract for processing in 2009-2012 crop years.  
Growers in Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Michigan, Minnesota, Ohio and Wisconsin will be eligible to 
participate in this program. 5 
 
food products or characteristics of food products that are deemed healthy (e.g., fruits 
and vegetables, dietary fiber content). 
The popular press has frequently depicted subsidies favoring commodities used 
in unhealthy food products as an important contributor to rising obesity (Alston, Sumner 
and Vosti 2008).  In particular, Pollan (2003, 2007, 2008) has claimed that subsidies on 
commodities like corn and wheat have led to lower prices of high-calorie, processed 
foods.  He has asserted that the subsidy-induced decline in the prices of high-calorie, 
processed foods versus low-calorie, less-processed foods, has been a primary 
contributor to the overconsumption of such foods, and subsequent increases in obesity 
rates.  He has pointed to the correlation between increased subsidies to corn farmers 
and obesity rates in the United States between the 1970s to the present as proof of this 
effect. 
Farm subsidies can affect the rate of obesity by changing the relative prices of 
commodities and retail foods, and hence, the composition of food consumption, but a 
range of studies have demonstrated that the magnitude of this effect is likely to be small 
(Alston, Sumner, and Vosti, 2006, Alston, Sumner, and Vosti 2008, Beghin and Jensen 
2008, Miller and Coble 2007, Schmidhuber 2004, Senauer and Gemma 2006).  This 
finding has several elements. 
First, farm subsidies increase both production and consumption of subsidized 
commodities by increasing the net return to farmers and lowering the market price paid 
by consumers.  For example, if subsidies are applied more to commodities that are 
inputs for unhealthy foods compared to healthy foods, then the increase in the 
consumption of unhealthy foods can be partly attributed to the farm subsidies.  Evidence 
from the United States and other OECD countries suggests that the effect of commodity 
subsidies on commodity prices is small (Alston, Sumner, and Vosti, 2008).  In particular, 
Beghin and Jensen (2008) found that subsidies on corn have a negligible effect on the 6 
 
price of food products that use high fructose corn syrup (HFCS) in the United States.  
They attributed substantial declines in the price of corn, and hence, HFCS and food 
products that use HFCS to technical change rather than subsidies.  In addition, since the 
price of sugar in the United States is considerably higher than the world price because of 
U.S. import restrictions, Beghin and Jensen (2008) and Alston, Sumner and Vosti (2008) 
both concluded that the net effect of farm policies (corn subsidies and import barriers on 
sugar) has been to increase the price and discourage consumption of caloric sweeteners. 
Schmidhuber (2004), Loureiro and Nayga (2005) and Alston, Sumner, and Vosti 
(2008) showed that agricultural policies, including subsidies and trade barriers, have 
actually resulted in higher food costs for consumers across OECD countries.  Countries 
with higher food costs tend to have lower rates of obesity, so if anything subsidies and 
trade barriers have contributed to reducing obesity, but the effects in the United States 
must have been very small.  Other agricultural policies may have had more significant 
effects on obesity.  Alston, Sumner and Vosti (2006, 2008) suggested that productivity 
gains resulting from agricultural research and development (R&D) have been much 
more important than commodity subsidies as a determinant of food prices.  Moreover, 
Miller and Coble (2007, 2008) estimated that increases in total factor productivity 
contributed more to lowering prices of retail food products, and thus, the portion of 
income spent on food, than did subsidies to farmers for the United States and across 
OECD countries. 
Second, the magnitude of the effect of the changes in commodity prices on retail 
prices depends on the cost share of the commodity on retail prices. Since the commodity 
share of the retail price of foods is generally small (i.e. approximately 20 percent) in the 
United States, changes in the price of commodities used in high-calorie foods may not 
translate into perceptible changes in the price of high-calorie food products (Alston 
Sumner and Vosti, 2008).  Schmidhuber (2004) noted that developed countries have 7 
 
much higher marketing margins than less-developed countries and that policies that 
affect commodity prices in the presence of higher marketing margins are unlikely to have 
much impact on food prices, and hence, consumption. Hence, higher marketing margins 
for commodities have dampened the effects of policy-induced commodity price changes 
on retail food prices.  
Third, even if policies generate a relatively larger price drop in unhealthy foods 
versus healthy foods, consumers may not respond much to changes in the price of food 
products.  Several studies have explored the impact of relative prices on weight gains in 
the United States.  Lakdawalla and Philipson (2002) argued that the expansion in the 
supply of food through agricultural innovation has allowed the real price of foods to 
decline, allowing for increases in food consumption, and thus, increases in weight.  They 
attributed 41 percent of growth in BMI to declines in the cost of food products and 59 
percent to changes in physical activity.  Alternatively, Bleich et al. (2007) attributed 80 
percent of the growth in BMI across OECD countries to increases in calorie supply, and 
found that reductions in relative food prices were associated with increased calorie 
supply.  Huffman et al. (2006) found that an increase in the price of food leads to 
decreases in obesity-related mortality across OECD countries. 
Further, some studies have suggested that a decline in the price of “unhealthy” 
foods relative to “healthy” foods has been the primary contributor to obesity.  
Drewnowski and Specter (2004) and Drewnowski and Darmon (2005) hypothesized that 
the price differential between energy-dense versus energy-dilute foods has caused 
individuals to substitute out of energy-dilute foods into energy-dense foods.
7
                                                 
7 Energy density is defined as the amount of available dietary energy per unit of weight 
(expressed in kcal/g or kJ/g). Water accounts for most of the variability in energy density because 
it provides weight but not energy.  Fiber also contributes to energy density because it provides 
little energy. Foods high in water and/or fiber are therefore energy dilute, or low-energy-dense. 
Conversely, fat provides the greatest amount of energy per gram, hence high-fat foods tend to be 
high-energy-dense (Newby 2006). 
  Gelbach, 8 
 
Klick and Strattman (2007) found that individuals do substitute between healthful and 
unhealthful foods when relative prices change, but this relative price effect accounts for 
only about 1 percent of the rise in average BMI during their sample period.
8
Evaluations of fiscal instruments like taxes and subsidies have primarily focused 
on consumer responses, largely ignoring the potential role that producers play in food 
production.  A tax or subsidy applied to specific categories of food has been suggested 
by several lawmakers (Adamy 2009, Chan 2008) and evaluated in the academic 
literature.  Jacobson and Brownell (2000) and Brownell and Frieden (2009) discussed 
how small taxes on snack foods and sweetened beverages can generate revenues that 
could be earmarked for health promotion.  However, both acknowledged that the 
magnitude of the tax revenues generated from such taxes would be decreased by 
substitution effects and the orientation of the supply curve for soft drinks and snacks.  
  Assuming 
sugar is addictive, Miljkovic, Njange and de Chastenet (2007) found low current prices of 
sugar induced greater consumption of all foods today and weight gains in the future. 
However, under the rational addiction hypothesis, the expectation of a future increase in 
prices of sweet food leads to increased sugar consumption in the current period by 
overweight and obese people, and decreased sugar consumption in the current period 
by normal weight people.  Chou, Grossman, and Saffer (2004) argued that food 
consumed at fast food and certain full-service restaurants tend to be higher in calories 
than foods prepared at home, and the cost of purchasing such foods has declined.  They 
found that the real price of fast food, food at home and full-service restaurants have 
negative and significant effects on BMI and probability of being obese, but again, these 
effects are small. 
                                                 
8 Their definitions of “healthy” and “unhealthy” foods are dependent upon the availability of prices 
from the Bureau of Labor Statistics.  They defined healthy foods as all fruits and vegetables, tuna, 
milk and yogurt, and “unhealthy” foods as American processed cheese, bologna, butter, cola, 9 
 
Kuchler, Tegene and Harris (2005) and Richards, Patterson and Tegene (2007) 
accounted for the substitution between snack foods by estimating and utilizing 
elasticities of demand and assumed the supply of snack foods is perfectly elastic.  They 
estimated that a tax on snack products would have negligible effects on consumption but 
could generate substantial revenues for health education.   
Schroeter, Tyner and Lusk (2008) went one step further and calculated the 
elasticity of weight with respect to a one percent change in price of several food products.  
Contrary to Chou, Grossman and Saffer (2004), they found that taxes on food away from 
home would lead to increases in weight for men and women in the United States. They 
also found that subsidies on the prices of fruits and vegetables would likely be ineffective.  
A tax on high-calorie or a subsidy on low-calorie soda achieved greater weight losses, 
but the magnitude of change was predicted to be small.  
Alternatively, Cash, Sunding and Zilberman (2005) found that small subsidies to 
consumers for fruits and vegetables could be an economically efficient way to decrease 
the number of cases of strokes and heart disease caused by deficiencies in fruit and 
vegetable consumption.  They found that the cost of fruit and vegetable subsidies per life 
saved would be substantially less than the value of the life saved. 
Taxes and subsidies on product ingredients or nutrients have also been 
evaluated in the academic literature.  Smed, Jensen, and Denver (2007) estimated the 
effects of a tax on fat and sugar content, and a subsidy on fiber content for a multiple 
food groups in Denmark.  They found that such taxes are unlikely to reduce calorie 
consumption.  Chouinard et al. (2007) tested whether a tax on fat content of dairy 
products can affect calorie consumption and weight, and calculated the deadweight 
losses from such a tax.  Assuming the supply of dairy products is perfectly elastic, they 
                                                                                                                                                 
cupcakes, ice cream, malt beverages, margarine, peanut butter, pork and beans, potato chips, 
frozen french fries, and shortening. 10 
 
found a tax applied to the fat content of dairy products would decrease fat consumption, 
but would lead to less than a pound per person per year reduction in weight, holding all 
other determinants of weight constant.  However, they also found that the consumer 
welfare losses from the fat tax on dairy products would be only slightly more than the 
revenue generated (-$4.48 billion versus $4.45 billion).  In addition, O’Donoghue and 
Rabin (2006) found that taxes on unhealthy foods for a heterogeneous population, 
where a fraction of the population exhibits self-control problems in terms of food 
consumption, can actually lead to Pareto improvements in social welfare. 
Finally, a value-added tax or subsidy can be applied to food products (VAT).  In 
other words, the foods that most closely resemble products sold at the farm gate would 
incur lower taxes and highly processed foods would be more highly taxed.  Gustavsen 
and Rickertsen (2006) estimated the effect of the removal of the VAT (11 percent price 
decrease) on fruit and vegetable consumption in Norway.  They found that removal of 
the VAT would be likely to increase purchases of fruits and vegetables for high-
consuming households but would have little effect on low-consuming households.  
Taxes and subsidies can be used on commodity and retail food products to 
induce change in consumption patterns, and hence, weight outcomes.  Evidence shows 
that agricultural policies like investment in agricultural R&D can be and have been 
effective in changing commodity and retail prices much more than commodity subsidies. 
Several countries including the United States have increased funding for specialty crops 
as a means of changing the composition of food consumption (Cash et al. 2006, Martin 
2008).  Most of the studies find that taxes and subsidies applied to food products or 
ingredients in food products will lead to decreases in calorie or fat consumption but the 
magnitude of these effects are small over a small time horizon.  However, it is likely that 
changes in food consumption, and hence, obesity from most policies will occur in the 
long term. 11 
 
4.  Agricultural R&D and Commodity Prices 
In real terms agricultural commodity prices trended down significantly during the 
past 100 years, reflecting growth in supply of agricultural products outstripping growth in 
demand that was fueled by increases in population and per capita incomes.  The long-
term trend in deflated prices has been remarkable.  Over the 55 years between 1950 
and 2005, in real terms commodity prices fell at an average annual rate of 1.6 to 2.5 
percent; over the 30 years between 1975 and 2005, at an average rate of 2.6 to 3.9 
percent per year (Alston, Beddow, and Pardey 2009).  Alston, Beddow and Pardey 
(2009) attributed these trends in prices primarily to growth in farm productivity—in terms 
of crop yields, broader partial productivity measures, and multifactor productivity 
measures—which they ascribed primarily to public and private investments in 
agricultural R&D. 
Evidence on Returns to R&D and R&D Lags 
Alston, Andersen, James and Pardey (2009) modeled state-specific U.S. 
agricultural productivity for the period 1949-2002 as a function of public agricultural 
research and extension investments over 1890-2002.  The results supported relatively 
long research lags (an overall lag length of 50 years with a peak impact at 24 years but 
with most of the impact exhausted within 40 years), with a very substantial share of a 
state’s productivity growth attributable to research conducted by other states and the 
federal government.  The authors found that U.S. public agricultural R&D, whether 
undertaken by state or federal government, yielded very handsome returns.   
Table 1 summarizes the results from the preferred model, showing the 
distribution of own-state and national benefits from state-specific and federal 
investments in agricultural research and extension in the United States, expressed in 
terms of benefit-cost ratios and internal rates of return.  The results show that marginal 
increments in investments in agricultural research and extension (R&E) by the 48 12 
 
contiguous U.S. states generated own-state benefits of between $2 and $58 per 
research dollar, averaging $21 across the states (the lower benefit-cost ratios were 
generally for the states with smaller and shrinking agricultural sectors, especially in New 
England).  Allowing for the spillover benefits into other states, state-specific agricultural 
research investments generated national benefits that ranged between $10 and $70 per 
research dollar across the states, with an average of $32.  The marginal benefit-cost 
ratio for USDA intramural research was comparable, at $18 per dollar invested in 
research. 
[Table 1: Benefit-Cost Ratios and Internal Rates of Return to U.S. Agricultural R&D] 
The benefit-cost ratios in Table 1 are generally large, and might seem 
implausibly large to some readers.  In fact, however, these ratios are consistent with 
internal rates of return at the smaller end of the range compared with the general results 
in the literature as reviewed by Alston et al. (2000a), and as discussed by others (e.g., 
Evenson 2002; Fuglie and Heisey 2007).  Specifically the estimates of own-state 
“private” rates of return ranged from 7.4 to 27.6 percent, with an average of 18.9 percent 
per annum across the states and the estimates of national “social” rates of return ranged 
from 15.3 to 29.1 percent, with an average of 22.9 percent per annum across the states, 
and the rate of return to USDA intramural research was 18.7 percent per annum. 
Relative Prices of Specialty Crops, Other Crops, and Livestock  
While all food commodity prices have trended down in real terms, the 
movements have been uneven, with important differences among commodity 
categories.
9
                                                 
9 Alston and Pardey (2008) reviewed past trends in prices in the context of their analysis of the 
economics of R&D on specialty crops, and material presented in this section is drawn mainly from 
their analysis.   
  Figure 1, panel a shows the nominal prices for the main product categories.  
The prices of specialty crops have grown both absolutely and relative to field crops and 13 
 
livestock products, which have had fairly static nominal prices for the 20 years prior to 
2004 in spite of general cost inflation.
10
[Figure 1:  Nominal and Relative Prices of Specialty Crops, 1949-2004] 
  Figure 1 Panel b shows the same price series 
deflated by the implicit price deflator for gross domestic product (representing prices 
generally in the economy).  Figure 2 shows the corresponding average annual rate of 
change in deflated output prices for the period 1950-2004.  Prices received by farmers 
for all crop categories trend down relative to prices paid by consumers for all goods and 
services.  Associated with these price changes have been substantial increases in 
quantities produced and consumed.  The increase in consumption could be accounted 
for by the lower real price or growth in demand, or a combination of the two.  The 
increase in production in spite of lower real producer prices indicates that supply must 
have increased.   
[Figure 2:  Real Movement in Prices of Specialty Crops, 1949-2004] 
A first impulse may be to assume that, since prices have fallen faster for other 
products (i.e., field crops and livestock), the rate of growth in productivity and increase in 
supply must have been comparatively slow for specialty crops.  However, such an 
interpretation may not be justified.  More-specific interpretations are possible if we have 
more information.  For instance, if we know the elasticity of supply, we can partition 
changes in production into those associated with changes in prices and those 
associated with shifts in supply; and if we know the price elasticity of demand, we can 
partition changes in consumption into those associated with changes in prices and those 
associated with shifts in demand.  
                                                 
10 As discussed by Alston, Sumner, and Vosti (2006), some of these price increases for specialty 
crops might reflect premia for changes in quality, variety, or seasonal availability, which might not 
have been fully addressed in the indexing procedure.  This possibility is a subject for continuing 
research, and is set aside for the time being.   14 
 
Here, we are mainly interested in the supply side.  The indexes of prices and 
quantity for the different categories of output grew at different rates over the period 1949 
through 2004, as summarized in Table 2.  The indexes all started at 100 in 1949.  By 
2004 the quantity indexes had reached 212 for livestock (i.e., the index grew by 112 
percent), 278 for field crops, 262 for vegetables, 283 for fruits and nuts, and 742 for 
nursery and greenhouse marketing.  In contrast, the corresponding price indexes were 
307 for livestock, 190 for field crops, 489 for vegetables, 519 for fruits and nuts, and 534 
for nursery and greenhouse marketing.  Dividing by the GDP deflator, which had grown 
from 1.0 in 1949 to 6.69 in 2004, the corresponding real price indexes were 45.9 for 
livestock, 28.4 for field crops, 73.1 for vegetables, 77.5 for fruits and nuts, and 79.8 for 
nursery and greenhouse marketing.  Suppose, for the sake of argument, that the 
relevant elasticity of supply is ε = 1.0.  A real price index of 45.9 for livestock in 2004 
indicates a price decrease of 55.1 percent since 1949, which given ε = 1.0, ceteris 
paribus, would imply a 55.1 percent decrease in quantity supplied.  Subtracting the 
price-induced change in quantity supplied (– 55.1 percent) from the overall observed 
growth in quantity (112 percent) implies an increase in livestock supply of 167.1 percent 
(i.e., 112 – (– 55.1) = 167.1 percent).  Table 2 reports the corresponding computations 
for each category of production using an elasticity of supply of either ε = 1.0 or ε = 0.5.   
[Table 2:  Growth in Production and Prices for Agricultural Products, 1949–2004] 
Considering the estimates made using an elasticity of ε = 1.0, the computed 
growth rates of supply of vegetables as well as fruits and nuts fall in between those of 
livestock and field crops.  Only greenhouse and nursery is outside the typical range for 
livestock and other crops.  When we use an elasticity of ε = 0.5 instead, the differences 
in the computed growth rates of supply are reduced.  In either case, with the exception 
of nursery and greenhouse, which has been growing much faster but from a very small 
base, supply of specialty crops has been growing at a rate similar to that for the supply 15 
 
of U.S. agricultural products generally.  Thus there is not a prima facie case to suggest 
that specialty crops have been technological orphans.  Of course, we have not identified 
the source of the growth in supply, and it might be mostly from increases in acreage and 
capital investment in fruit and nuts and other specialty crops, and mostly from new 
technology in field crops, but whether that is so remains a matter of speculation for now.   
Some authors have attributed at least some of the rising obesity in the United 
States to the relatively slow decline in real prices of specialty crops.  Whether these 
relative price movements are attributable to relatively slow growth in supply or relatively 
fast growth in demand for specialty crops, the price changes themselves will have 
contributed to the observed consumption patterns.  In particular, they will have 
contributed to the observed under-consumption of fruit and vegetables relative to the 
recommendations of health professionals—as, for instance, contained in the USDA food 
pyramid.  In turn, it has been argued that the government should do something to 
reverse this pattern—to change the relative prices in favor of fruit and vegetables.  One 
suggested approach is to tax other products, subsidize fruit and vegetables, or both (see 
for instance, Cash, Sunding, and Zilberman 2005).  An alternative approach is to change 
the emphasis of agricultural R&D by increasing productivity-enhancing research into 
specialty crops, reducing productivity-enhancing research into other commodities, or 
both.  In what follows we examine these alternatives using a relatively simple model of 
supply and demand for two categories of commodities, specialty crops and others. 
5.  A Stylized Model of Agricultural R&D and Commodity Prices 
In the illustrative simulation model developed here consider two categories of 
agricultural commodities, “specialty crops” and “other.”  We use this model to examine 
the implications of subsidies on specialty crops or taxes on other commodities versus an 16 
 
increase in R&D on specialty crops (as introduced in the 2008 Farm Bill), perhaps at the 
expense of R&D on other commodities. 
Commodity Policy as Public Health Policy: Some Issues  
Some basic questions can be asked about whether commodity policy should 
ever be used as public health policy.  Nevertheless, changes in commodity policies have 
been proposed and introduced as treatments for nutrition and health problems 
associated with obesity.  Consequently an exploration of the potential is justified.  Before 
embarking on that exercise, we point out some aspects that must be set aside before we 
can begin to conduct an analysis of food and nutrition policy in the context of a simplified 
model of the market for food commodities.   
First, consumers do not consume agricultural commodities.  A number of 
agricultural commodities are used primarily as ingredients in livestock feed.  And even 
food commodities typically are substantially transformed as they are combined with other 
commodities and other inputs to make food—including transformations that take place 
within households as meals are prepared from retail food products made from farm 
commodities.   
Second, for related reasons, those who propose taxes (e.g., on fat or calories) as 
instruments of public health policy usually refer to taxes on food products rather than on 
food commodities.  A fat tax applied to food products would have an ultimate incidence 
on food commodities, depending on their fat content and on other factors, in ways that 
are difficult to infer because the food marketing chain is complex. Likewise, a tax applied 
to particular farm commodities would have an ultimate incidence on particular foods (and 
on particular nutrients) but again it is difficult to infer that incidence with any precision.  
The same comments apply when the instrument is agricultural R&D, and these aspects 
make it difficult to compare agricultural R&D policies (affecting supply of farm 17 
 
commodities) with taxes on retail food products, as alternative instruments for achieving 
particular health and nutrition outcomes.  
Third, there is no clear mapping from health outcomes to particular food products, 
let alone to particular farm commodities.  Certainly sugar and other caloric sweeteners 
such as high-fructose corn syrup are implicated in obesity and its consequences, but 
food products containing these ingredients are not necessarily unhealthy for all 
consumers.  A policy of taxing these ingredients may well result in reduced consumption 
of products containing them, with favorable impacts on the general health of the 
population.  But a tax on calories is comparatively blunt, and likely to be comparatively 
inefficient, as an instrument of public health policy because it will influence consumption 
choices not only by those consumers who were but also by those who were not 
generating negative externalities through the health-care system.
11
Fourth, in our application we are aggregating all agricultural commodities into two 
groups: (1) specialty crops, and (2) other.  Each of these groups includes dozens of 
different commodities, the consumption of which could contribute positively or negatively 
to the prevalence of obesity and consequent externalities through the health-care 
system, depending on a host of other factors (including everything else that is consumed 
as part of the diet, other lifestyle choices, in conjunction with the genetic predisposition 
of individuals).  As an abstraction and simplification we model these two aggregates as 
though “specialty crops” do not entail any externalities, while the consumption of foods 
based on other agricultural commodities does entail a negative externality that arises 
 
                                                 
11 Similar arguments apply to alcohol taxes that fall equally on alcohol consumers regardless of 
whether they do or do not generate any social problems or externalities.  We can imagine a more-
closely targeted instrument may be fairer and more efficient—such as heavier taxes on particular 
alcohol-containing products that are more-frequently associated with drink-driving, violence, or 
alcohol-related health problems—but designing and implementing discriminatory taxes to achieve 
such purposes is never simple or easy.   18 
 
from impacts on human health in conjunction with a health-care system in which 
individual costs of illness are not borne entirely individually. 
A Multi-Market Model  
Figure 3 represents the market for commodity S (specialty crops) in panel a, and 
the market for commodity O (other farm products) in panel b.  We assume that the 
cross-product impacts on the supply side are likely to be negligible and focus attention 
on the substitution between “specialty crops” and “other” food commodities on the 
demand side.  Now, suppose, as a result of an increase in specialty crops research 
investments, supply of specialty crops shifts down in parallel by a fraction ks of the initial 
price, from SS0 to SS1, in panel a.  A conventional measure of the benefits from this 
research-induced supply shift is equal to the area behind the demand curve, DS 
between the two supply curves in panel a (i.e., the area I0abI1).  This total benefit is 
approximately equal to the research-induced cost saving per unit times the number of 
units affected—i.e., ksPS0QS0.   
[Figure 3: A Research Induced Supply Shift for Specialty Crops] 
In a typical partial equilibrium analysis, the same total amount (i.e., area I0abI1) is 
interpreted as a benefit to consumers of specialty crops equal to area PS0abPS1 and, 
under the special assumption of a vertically parallel supply shift, a benefit to producers of 
specialty crops equal to area PS1bcd.  But this interpretation is valid only if the prices of 
other goods are fixed.  However, in panel b, the implication of the lower price for 
specialty crops is a reduction in demand for other food commodities (assuming they are 
substitutes), shifting from DO0 to DO1, and the ultimate equilibrium is at a lower price, 
PO1 and quantity, QO1.   
In this case, the measure of total benefits is still valid, so long as there are no 
market distortions and the demand curve for specialty crops is sufficiently generally 
defined (specifically, the demand curve DS reflects “general equilibrium” feedback 19 
 
effects of induced changes in prices for other products when the price of specialty crops 
changes).
12
Now, however, suppose the consumption of other products involves a negative 
externality of E per unit, invalidating a key assumption underpinning the analysis above.  
The conventional welfare measure that does not account for changes in the externality 
per unit or the number of units to which it applies is no longer valid.  Assuming the 
externality is constant at E per unit, before and after the shift in demand for other 
products, the increase in supply of specialty crops has resulted in a reduction of net 
social costs of the externality equal to area bcde in panel b, equivalent to E (QO0 – QO1), 
which is an additional benefit from the increase in supply of specialty crops.  Thus the 
gross annual benefits from specialty crops research (GARBS) in the presence of the 
externality from consumption of other products is equal to the benefit in the absence of 
the externality (i.e., area I0abI1 ≈ ksPS0QS0) minus the research-induced change in the 
social cost of the externality: E (QO0 – QO1).  In other words 
  In this approach it would be double-counting to add the reduction in 
producer surplus accruing to producers of other products (area PO0abPO1 in panel b) to 
the total benefits measured in panel a, although this area is valid as a measure of losses 
to those producers given the assumption of independent supply.   
(1)  GARBS ≈ ksPS0QS0 – E (QO1 – QO0) > ksPS0QS0. 
Conversely, the benefits from “other” agricultural research in the presence of the 
externality will be lower than they would be otherwise to the extent that the research-
induced increase in consumption entails an increase in the social costs of the 
                                                 
12 However, the areas of “consumer surplus” and “producer surplus” may no longer have 
individual welfare significance (see Just, Hueth and Schmitz, 1982; Alston, Norton, and Pardey 




(2)  GARBO ≈ koPO0QO0 – E (QO1 – QO0) < koPO0QO0. 
  In the case of a shift down of supply of other products by a fraction ko of 
the price: 
This analysis shows how the presence of a negative externality associated with 
consumption of other agricultural products implies smaller research benefits for other 
products and greater research benefits for specialty crops, everything else equal, 
justifying a reallocation of research resources towards specialty crops and away from 
other products, everything else equal.  This is an intuitive result, consistent with the 
types of arguments made both by some proponents of the Specialty Crops Research 
Initiative and by others who have criticized and argued for a reduction of support for 
public agricultural research directed towards corn and certain other commodities 
(Schoonover and Miller 2006).  
The qualitative argument is clear in this simplified representation (recall the 
issues raised above about commodity policy as an instrument of public health policy).  
The quantitative importance of the externality relative to other considerations is an 
empirical question with implications for whether any reallocation of research resources is 
warranted.  In particular, if research that enhances supply of specialty crops or supply of 
other commodities would yield equal marginal private benefits (i.e., ignoring any 
externalities) with the current allocation, then the presence externalities as shown would 
justify a redirection of some resources from other research towards specialty crops 
research.  However, when there is little basis for assuming equal benefits at the margin 
from specialty crops, the case for redirecting research resources is less clear.   
                                                 
13 Alston and Martin (1995) demonstrated the general result that the benefits from research in the 
presence of a distortion are equal to the benefits from research in the absence of the distortion 
minus the effect of the same research on the social costs of the distortion. 21 
 
Moreover, the evidence of very large benefit-cost ratios for agricultural research 
means (1) the externality would have to be very large to justify reducing “other” 
agricultural research and (2) an increase in specialty crops research would be justified 
even in the absence of an externality.  The evidence would support an increase in 
research on both “other” agricultural commodities and specialty crops, with an externality 
argument potentially supporting a relative increase in specialty crops research, even if 
we did not have the option of using other policy instruments that could more directly 
address the externality associated with individuals making unhealthy consumption 
choices in conjunction with distortions in incentives associated with health care.  
Quantitative Considerations 
An algebraic counterpart of the model represented in Figure 3 can be used to 
make our arguments more concrete and, if information on the key parameters can be 
obtained, to quantify the main effects.  The equations of the model include supply and 
demand equations for each of the two categories of goods.  Thus the model is given by: 
(3a)  QS = ds(PS, PO) – demand for specialty crops 
(3b)  QO = do(PS, PO) – demand for other products 
(3c)  QS = ss(PS, RS) – supply of specialty crops 
(3d)  QO = so(PO, RO) – supply of other products 
In these equations, ds and do denote the demand functions for specialty crops and other 
products, respectively, both as functions of the price of specialty crops, PS and other 
products, PO, while ss and so denote the supply functions for specialty crops and other 
products, respectively, each as a function of its own price (PS or PO) and its own 
research (RS or RO).  
Taking logarithmic differentials, the equations of the model can be expressed in 
terms of proportional changes and elasticities of supply and demand as follows: 
(4a)  d ln QS = ηss d ln PS + ηso d ln PO  22 
 
(4b)  d ln QO = ηos d ln PS + ηoo d ln PO  
(4a)  d ln QS = εss d ln PS + εsr d ln RS  
(4d)  d ln QO = εoo d ln PO + εor d ln RO  
These four equations can be solved for proportional (or percentage) changes in the four 
endogenous variables—two quantities produced and consumed (QS and QO) and two 
prices (PS and PO)—as functions of the own- and cross-price elasticities of demand (ηss, 
ηoo, ηso, ηos), elasticities of supply with respect to prices and research spending (εss, εoo, εsr, 
εor), and exogenous increases in research spending.   
Assume that the total research budget is fixed, such that any increase in the 
budget for specialty crops research comes at the expense of other agricultural research.  
Then ws d ln RS = – (1 – ws) d ln RO, where ws is the share of research expenditure on 
specialty crops.  Further, consider a 1 percent increase in spending on specialty crops 
research, such that 100 x d ln RS = 1, and therefore 100 x d ln RO = – (1 – ws)/ws.  The 
solution is: 
(5)   
( )
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Own-price elasticities of demand are negative numbers (i.e., ηss < 0, ηoo < 0), and 
under most reasonable assumptions the cross-price elasticities will be positive numbers 
(i.e., ηso > 0, ηos > 0) meaning that the two types of commodities are substitutes.  
Therefore, a 1 percent increase in research spending on specialty crops would result in 
an increase in production and consumption of specialty crops and a decrease in 
production and consumption of other products (i.e., d ln QS > 0 and d ln QO < 0), and 23 
 
the price of specialty crops would fall relative to the price of other products (i.e., d ln PS 
< 0 and d ln PO > 0).   
We can use the results in equation (5) combined with equations (1) and (2) to 
infer approximate welfare impacts of the reallocation of research resources.
14
(6)  GARB ≈ (εsr /εss)(PS0QS0)/100  
  
Combining equations (1) and (2) yields a measure of the GARB from a one-percent 
increase in R&D spending on specialty crops with a commensurate reduction in R&D 
spending on other crops such that the total spending on R&D is held constant: 
– (εor /εoo)[(1 – ws)/ws] (PO0QO0)/100  
– QO0 E (d ln QO) 
In this equation the first term represents the “private” benefits from a 1 percent increase 
in spending on specialty crops research; the second term represents the foregone 
“private” benefits from “other” research that was reduced to finance the increase in 
specialty crops research; and the third term represents the reduction in the externality 
associated with the consumption of other products. This last term reflects reduced 
consumption of other products both as a result of doing less other research and as a 
result of doing more specialty crops research with its substitution effect on consumption 
of other products. 
Equation (6) can be reduced further by substituting for d ln QO from (5) and by 
dividing throughout by the total value of agricultural production, and multiplying by 100, 
such that we express gross annual research benefits as a percentage of the value of 
agricultural production (G): 
(7) G ≈ (εsr /εss)vs – (εor /εoo) (1 – vs) [(1 – ws)/ws] – 100 (E/PO0)(1 – vs) (d ln QO)  
                                                 
14 To do so we note a 1 percent increase in research spending for commodity i (where i = o or s) 
which causes an increase in supply (quantity direction) by εir percent is equivalent to a vertical 
research-induced shift down in supply by εir / εii percent of the initial price:  i.e., ki = (εir / εii) / 100. 24 
 
where  ( ) ηεε η η ε ηη ε = − − −− × d [ { ( ) } 1–  / ]/(100 ) os oo sr oo ss ss so os or s s lnQO w w D .  
The sign of this expression depends on whether the private benefits from 
specialty crops (the first term) research plus the reduction in the externality (the third 
term) outweigh the foregone private benefits from other research.  It is an empirical 
question that depends on a number of variables: 
•  the importance of specialty crops as a share of total output, vs  
•  the importance of specialty crops research as a share of total research, wr  
•  the elasticity of marginal cost with respect to research, given by the elasticity of 
supply with respect to research divided by the elasticity of supply with respect to 
price, both for specialty crops (εsr /εss) and other products (εor /εoo) 
•  the externality as a fraction of the initial price of other products, E/PO0 
•  the own and cross-price elasticities of demand for both products (ηss, ηoo, ηso, ηos) 
and the elasticities of supply with respect to prices and research spending (εss, 
εoo, εsr, εor). 
6.  Agricultural R&D versus Taxes and Subsidies  
A subsidy on specialty crops funded by a tax on other agricultural outputs is 
analogous to a reallocation of existing research resources in the sense that (1) it would 
be self-financing, without requiring any additional taxpayer funding, and (2) it would 
directly and indirectly (through cross-price effects) encourage consumption and 
production of specialty crops and at the same time it would directly and indirectly 
(through cross-price effects) discourage production and consumption of other outputs.  
R&D lags are an important consideration.  They mean that we may have to wait many 
years before a change in research policy implemented today has effects on production, 
prices, and consumption, let alone effects on obesity which has its own cumulative, 
dynamic characteristics.  These dynamic relationships warrant their own detailed 25 
 
analysis, which we will set aside for the time being.  This aspect has potentially 
important implications for the comparison between tax-subsidy policies that take effect 
immediately and R&D policies that take effect many years later, as discussed by Alston 
(2009). 
Importantly, it seems likely that both specialty crops research and other research 
have large rates of return, with or without any allowance for externalities through the 
health-care system (e.g., see Alston and Pardey 2008).  And it could be the case that it 
is not worth redirecting research resources towards specialty crops, even though doing 
so would reduce health-care system costs.
15
Even so it could be worth increasing funding of specialty crops research using 
taxpayer funding.  A reasonable comparison, then, is between taking a given amount of 
taxpayer funds and using it to finance a subsidy on specialty crops or using the same 
money to finance an increase in research into specialty crops.  This issue is similar to 
the case studied by Alston (2009).  If agricultural R&D has a benefit-cost ratio of, say 
10:1, a dollar of research spending that causes a vertically parallel supply shift has an 
impact equivalent to $10 of output subsidy—in present value equivalent terms.  
Importantly, however, while the impacts of a subsidy are clear and immediate, the 
impacts of research are far in the future, diffuse, and uncertain.  Only those producers 
who adopt the resulting innovations will benefit, and under alternative assumptions about 
  In other words, the social payoff to 
research into “other” agricultural commodities may be so high, externalities 
notwithstanding, that financing an increase in specialty crops research by reducing other 
research is not favored.   
                                                 
15 This could be so, for instance, if the private payoff is relatively low—i.e., εsr /εss << εor /εoo—
because of the industrial structure or agronomic features of specialty crops, as discussed by 
Alston and Pardey (2008).   26 
 
the nature of the technological change (e.g., if it causes a pivotal supply shift) producers 
collectively will benefit much less. 
7.  Implications for U.S. Policy  
The issues addressed in this paper can be viewed in terms of three types of 
market distortions.  First, and foremost, are the distortions in incentives for individuals to 
economize on health care costs resulting from cost pooling through insurance and public 
provision of health-care services.  Without this distortion, the high cost of diet-related 
illness alone does not constitute a case for government intervention.  Second, are the 
distortions in agricultural production associated with farm program policies.  These 
policies are essentially redistributive in purpose, with side effects on production and 
prices, and hence consumption, of food and beverages.  Third, are the distortions in 
incentives for private provision of agricultural R&D, associated primarily with incomplete 
property rights over inventions, which are only partially offset by agricultural R&D 
policies including public agricultural R&D.  
Standard public economics arguments suggest that economic efficiency would 
be served by applying different, separate policy instruments to address each of these 
three types of distortions; though, to be sure, policies directed at any one of these 
distortions could have implications for the others.  In this framework, the application of 
instruments related to farm programs or agricultural R&D aiming to address public health 
concerns can be justified only in a second-best world in which public health policy has 
failed (i.e., the application of direct and more-appropriate health policy instruments has 
failed to correct distortions in incentives related to diet-related illness).   
We may well be in that world.  Some estimates suggest that the health-care 
system entails large externalities from excess obesity associated with moral hazard and 27 
 
adverse selection responses to health insurance.
16
U.S. farm subsidy policy comprises a complex set of programs that affect 
production costs, production, commodity prices, and farm incomes.  Economists have 
modeled and measured many impacts of these subsidies.  Nonetheless, the detailed 
quantitative effects of these policies on human nutrition and obesity are difficult to 
discern precisely.  Even the direction of the effect is not clear, since commodity-specific 
trade policy has clearly led to higher U.S. consumer prices of several major food 
commodities (such as dairy products, sugar, and orange juice).  But, the most important 
point is that, even when the direction of effects seems clear, the magnitude of the effects 
must be small.  Farm subsidies have had small effects on most farm commodity prices 
and even smaller effects on consumption.  U.S. farm subsidies have many critics.  A 
variety of arguments and evidence can be presented to show that the programs are 
ineffective, wasteful, or unfair (e.g., see Alston 2007; Alston and Sumner 2007; Sumner 
2005).  Eliminating farm subsidy programs could solve some of these problems, but 
could not be expected to have large and favorable effects on consumer incentives to eat 
more-healthy diets such that obesity rates would be meaningfully reduced.   
  In any event, it is an empirical 
question whether changing farm programs and agricultural R&D policies to influence 
farm commodity prices, as a mechanism for influencing consumption of food and the 
prevalence of obesity, would yield net social benefits.  In-principle arguments raise 
doubts about the odds, given the remoteness of the operation of the instruments (on 
production and prices of farm commodities) and the target (costs of obesity-related 
illness).  A consideration of the policies in practice reinforces these doubts. 
                                                 
16 Bhattacharya and Sood (2005) estimated a deadweight loss of $149 per insured person aged 
25 and older per year borne by privately-insured individuals from pooling versus higher premiums 
for obese individuals.  Across 170 million insured Americans older than 25, the total cost per year 
would be in the range of $25 billion per year.  We are not sure how much confidence to place in 
the estimate but we note that it is on a similar scale to available estimates of the annual benefits 
from U.S. public agricultural R&D (e.g., see Alston et al. 2009). 28 
 
Compared with farm program subsidies, public agricultural research policy has had 
much larger long-term effects on food prices and consumption in the past, and has greater 
potential to contribute to reducing (or increasing) rates of obesity in the future.  Agricultural 
R&D policy, like public health policy, is an example of government failure.  Available 
evidence clearly indicates a persistent underinvestment in agricultural R&D in spite of very 
significant government involvement.  The opportunity cost of particular agricultural R&D 
investments (not counting any impacts on public health) may be in the range of $10-20 per 
dollar invested (e.g., Alston, Anderson, James and Pardey 2009).  And the marginal returns 
may be very different among alternative elements of the portfolio.  In these circumstances, 
rebalancing the existing R&D budget to favor specialty crops (at the expense of, say, corn) 
with a view to reducing the prevalence of obesity may involve significant net social costs.  
On the other hand, an increase in specialty crops R&D, without reducing other R&D, could 
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(3% real discount rate)   
Internal Rate of Return 
Own-State  National  Own-State  National 
 
State R&E 
ratio    percent per year 
 
48 States:           
Average  21.0  32.1    18.9  22.7 
Minimum  2.4  9.9    7.4  15.3 
Maximum  57.8  69.2    27.6  29.1 
           
Selected States           
California  33.3  43.4    24.1  26.1 
Minnesota  40.6  55.4    24.7  27.3 
Wyoming  12.7  23.6    16.8  20.9 
           
           
USDA Research    17.5      18.7 
           
 
Source: Alston, Andersen, James, and Pardey (2009).  36 
 
Figure 2:  Real Movements in Prices of Specialty Crops, 1950-2004 
 
Source:  Alston and Pardey (2008). 
 






































































Table 2.  Growth in Production and Prices for Agricultural Products, 1949–2002 
Commodity Category 







ε = 1.0  ε = 0.5 
           
Livestock  112  207  –54.1  167.1  139.6 
Field Crops  178  90  –71.6  250.4  214.2 
Vegetables  162  389  –27.9  189.9  176.0 
Fruits and Nuts  183  419  –22.5  205.5  194.3 
Greenhouse & Nursery  642  534  –20.2  662.2  652.1 38 
 
Figure 3. A Research-Induced Supply Shift for Specialty Crops 
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